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I

COMMENTS

I

Redefining. Pennsylvania Corporate Law:
Eliminating Corporate Directors'
Fiduciary Obligations
I.

Introduction

On April 27, 1990, Pennsylvania Governor Robert P. Casey
signed into law Act No. 36 of 1990.1 Rarely does a bill that a Pennsylvania governor signs into law receive national, much less international, attention. Pennsylvania's new anti-takeover statute achieved
this distinction. Act 36 is what many consider to be the nation's most
stringent anti-takeover legislation.'
Representatives introduced this law into the Pennsylvania Legislature at the urging of Armstrong World Industries, located in
Lancaster, Pennsylvania. 3 Armstrong World Industries lobbied for
this legislation because it was the target of an unsolicited takeover
bid from Canada's Belzberg Group.' The legislature passed this law
principally in response to the Belzberg's failed takeover attempt.5
1. 1990 Pa. Legis. Serv. 36 (Purdon). On December 13, 1989, the Pennsylvania Senate
passed Act 36 by a vote of 45 to 4. Act 36 passed the House of Representatives on April 3,
1990, by a vote of 181 to 11. Pennsylvania's new anti-takeover legislation amends Title 15 of
the Pennsylvania Consolidated Statutes (Corporations and Unincorporated Associations). Title
15 is commonly referred to as the Business Corporation Law (BCL).
2. See. e.g., Michael W. Armstrong, 2 Spurn Protection of State Anti-Takeover Law,
PHILA. Bus. J., June 4, 1990, at 1. Philadelphia's CDI Corporation was the first company to
reject the protection of Act 36. Officials of CDI Corporation referred to Pennsylvania's antitakeover law as "overkill" and "anti-capitalistic." Id.
3. See generally Leslie Wayne, Many Companies in Pennsylvania Reject State's Takeover Protection, N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 1990, at Al.
4. Id.
5. Id.
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The enactment of the statute initiated a nationwide debate over a
state's role in regulating corporate takeovers.6
Pennsylvania's new anti-takeover statute represents a revolution
that changes a century of Pennsylvania corporate law. The anti-takeover statute's most controversial section is one that virtually eliminates a corporate director's fiduciary duty to the shareholders.
Under the new Act, shareholders are now just one of the. many

groups that a board of directors may consider when deciding what is
in the corporation's best interest. 8 Significantly, Act 36 amends the
directors' fiduciary duty with respect to all Pennsylvania corpora-

tions, for profit as well as nonprofit corporations.9 These new fiduciary duties apply to both public and private corporations, regardless

of their size. 10
In Section II, this Comment discusses the history behind a

state's right to enact anti-takeover statutes,11 specifically analyzing
Pennsylvania's new anti-takeover legislation and how Act 36 deviates
from nearly 100 years of Pennsylvania corporate law. In Section III,
this Comment analyzes the new statute's departure from some of the
nation's leading corporate law cases and compares Act 36 to other
states' anti-takeover statutes. Section IV discusses the probable consequences of Act 36 both inside and outside of Pennsylvania. Section
V focuses on the different approaches to takeover legislation. Finally,
this Comment concludes that Act 36 eliminates every fiduciary duty
owed by a corporate director. Pennsylvania corporate directors are
now free to define their own fiduciary duties.
6. Id.
7. 1990 Pa. Legis. Serv. 36 §§ 511(d), 1721(e) (Purdon).
8. 1990 Pa. Legis. Serv. 36 §§ 511 (d)(l), 1721(e)(1) (Purdon).
9. 1990 Pa. Legis. Serv. 36 § 1721 (Purdon).
10. Id.
11. Anti-takeover statutes are just one mechanism available to states for regulating businesses. Recent Supreme Court decisions have been expanding states' regulatory authority over
business. Areas of law once closed to the states are now open for the states to control. See, e.g.,
English v. General Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 272 (1990) (holding that workers in the nuclear industry who claim they were fired for pointing out safety problems are not barred by federal law
from suing their employers for damages under state law - even though federal law already
provides extensive remedies); California v. American Stores, 495 U.S. 271 (1990) (holding
that states can sue under federal antitrust laws to undo mergers deemed anti-competitive even
when the mergers were pre-approved by the U.S. Justice Department); Yellow Freight System
v. Donnelly, 494 U.S. 820 (1990) (holding that suits alleging violation of federal employment
discrimination laws can be filed in state, as well as in federal courts); Austin v. Michigan
Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990) (permitting states to bar corporate political
speech when the corporation is using its own funds, rather than funds of separate political
action committees, in support of a candidate). For an analysis of recent Supreme Court business cases, see Alan M. Slobodin, State Authority Over Businesses Is Broadened, NAT'L L.J.,
Aug. 13, 1990, at S13.

DIRECTORS' FIDUCIARY OBLIGATIONS

II.

States' Authority for Enacting Anti-Takeover Legislation

During the 1970's, the number of hostile takeovers of American
corporations was increasing.12 Since takeovers are perceived to disrupt local economies by causing layoffs and plant closings, legislatures attempted to regulate them."3 Further, legislatures felt there
was a need to protect other interests that might experience a "ripple
effect" from hostile takeovers."' States began to respond to this phenomenon by enacting anti-takeover statutes.' 5 Many of these antitakeover statutes attempted to protect one or more of the following
interests: labor, suppliers of goods, suppliers of services, suppliers of
credit, tax revenue bases, and communities.'
Many of these anti-takeover statutes, however, were declared
unconstitutional. 1 7 In the leading case of Edgar v. MITE Corp.,"8
12. See generally David Millon, State Takeover Laws: A Rebirth of Corporation Law?,
45 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 903 (1988).
13. See. e.g., Martin Lipton, Takeover Bids in the Target's Boardroom, 35 Bus. LAW.
101 (1979). Describing the legislative response to hostile corporate takeovers, the author
states, "In the early years of this century almost the sole focus of the directors of a corporation
was its shareholders. Efforts to broaden the concerns of directors to include employees, consumers, the community, the environment and the national welfare have reached full fruition
only during the last 20 years." Id. at 105. The motivation behind state anti-takeover legislation
is debated by many commentators. After studying Connecticut's anti-takeover statute, Professor Romano concluded that the legislature did not pass the statute for social or political objectives. Rather, she contends the statute was primarily a reaction to pressure from business interests. Roberta Romano, The Political Economy of Takeover Statutes, 73 VA. L. REV. I 1,
135 (1987). But see Millon, supra note 12, at 927-29.
14. See generally Millon, supra note 12. The author describes why states began enacting anti-takeover legislation:
These statutes . . . represent efforts to curb takeover activity on the ground that
takeovers are harmful to various nonshareholder constituencies that feel their
impact. Because the objective of hostile takeovers in recent years typically has
been to gain control and then to realize the full value of the target company by
dismantling or liquidating its assets, the impact on the communities in which
these target companies do business has been perceived to be extremely disruptive. Not only have management and lower level employees lost their jobs, but
ripple effects on the company's established network of suppliers, creditors, and
consumers, who are dependent on the firm for their livelihood, have been tremendous. State and local governments have lost tax revenues, and communities
have lost charitable contributions. These perceived effects on local economies,
rather than concern for shareholders, have prompted state action.
Millon, supra note 12, at 904-05.
15. See, e.g., A.A. Sommer, Other Constituency Statutes: A New Form of Welfarism?,
II Bus. LAW. UPDATE 1 (1990). States began to adopt so-called "other constituency statutes
- laws that [give] directors of locally incorporated companies the power to take into account
'constituencies' other than shareholders - employees, communities, customers, and suppliers.
Half of the states have adopted these statutes in one form or another." Id. at I. A byproduct
of state anti-takeover legislation is an increase in proxy battles. Proxy fights historically played
a role in the contest for board seats. However, with state anti-takeover statutes, proxy fights
have become very important in any struggle for corporate control. See Anthony J. Falkowski,
Proxy Battles Heat Up, Bus. INS., July 30, 1990, at 20.
16. Millon, supra note 12, at 919.
17. The first generation of state anti-takeover statutes were unconstitutional because
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the United States Supreme Court struck down an Illinois anti-takeover statute. The Court held that the Illinois Business Takeover20
Act 19 placed an unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce.
Although the Supreme Court struck down Illinois' attempt to protect
noninvestors, it still recognized the need to protect noninvestor interests.2 1 In his concurring opinion in Edgar v. MITE Corp.,22 Justice
Powell wrote that when corporate headquarters are relocated as the
result of an acquisition, "the state and locality from which the transfer is made inevitably suffer significantly." 2
Subsequently, courts declared many state anti-takeover laws unconstitutional.24 After Edgar v. MITE Corp., states turned away
from review mechanisms and rules supplementing the federal Williams Act of 19 6 8 .21They turned to their own corporate laws in orthey violated the Commerce Clause and the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution. See infra notes 18-24 and accompanying text. For a discus:ion of state anti-takeover
statutes and their relationship to the Commerce and Supremacy Clauses, see Gregg B. Fishbein, Three Generations of State Anti-Takeover Statutes: Their Legitimacy in Relation to
Their Effects on Interstate Commerce and the Supremacy Clause, 38 DRAKE L. REV. 437
(1989). See also David F. Crabtree, The Constitutionality of State Takeover Legislation Revisited: The Effect of CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America.. 1988 UTAH L. REV. 675
(1988); Mark A. Sargent, Do the Second-Generation State Takeover Statutes Violate the
Commerce Clause?, 8 CORP. L. REV. 3 (1985).
18. 457 U.S. 624 (1982).
19. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 121/2, para. 137.51-70 (1981) (repealed 1983).
20. MITE, 457 U.S. at 646. Four Justices (White, Powell, Stevens and O'Connor) and
Chief Justice Burger reached this conclusion. Id. at 642-43, 646, 654-55. Chief Justice Burger
and Justices White, Stevens and O'Connor also found that the statute directly regulated interstate commerce. Id. at 642, 655. Justices White and Blackmun and Chief Justice Burger found
the Illinois statute was preempted by federal takeover law. Id. at 639.
Finding that the statute placed an unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce, the
United State Supreme Court reasoned that the "effects of allowir.g the Illinois Secretary of
State to block a nationwide tender offer are substantial. Shareholders are deprived of the opportunity to sell their shares at a premium. The reallocation of economic resources to their
highest valued use, a process which can improve efficiency and competition, is hindered." Id. at
643. The Supreme Court stated that, "Insofar as the Illinois law burdens out-of-state transactions, there is nothing to be weighed in the balance to sustain the law." Id. at 644.
21. Id. "While protecting local investors is plainly a legitimat:e state objective, the State
has no legitimate interest in protecting nonresident shareholders." Id.
22. 457 U.S. 624, 646 (1982) (Powell, J., concurring).
23. Id. Justice Powell explained that "[m]anagement personnel - many of whom have
provided community leadership may move to the new corporate headquarters. Contributions to
cultural, charitable, and educational life - both in terms of leadership and financial support
also tend to diminish when there is a move of corporate headquarters." Id.
24. See, e.g., Fleet Aerospace Corp. v. Holderman, 796 F.2d 135 (6th Cir. 1986) (holding that the Ohio Control Share Acquisition Act was unconstitutional); Telvest v. Bradshaw,
697 F.2d 576 (4th Cir. 1983) (Virginia statute violates Commerce Clause); National City
Lines, Inc. v. LLC Corp., 687 F.2d 1122 (8th Cir. 1982) (Missouri statute violates Commerce
and Supremacy Clauses); TLX Acquisition Corp. v. Telex Corp., 679 F. Supp. 1022 (W.D.
Okla. 1987) (Oklahoma Control Shares Act violates Commerce Clause); Terry v. Yamashita,
643 F. Supp. 161 (D. Haw. 1986) (Control share acquisition statute in Hawaii comprises a
direct burden on interstate commerce).
25. Pub. L. 90-439, July 29, 1968, 82 Stat. 454. For a discussion of the Williams Act of
1968, see Lyman Johnson and David Millon, Misreading the Williams Act, 87 MICH. L. REV.
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der to regulate takeovers since corporations are creatures of state
law, rather than federal law. 6 Modifications to these laws were more
likely to survive a constitutional challenge. Courts could view these

statutes as a traditional exercise of jurisdiction over corporate "internal" matters.27 In fact, the United States Supreme Court upheld one

such statute in 1987.28 The Supreme Court, in CTS Corp. v. Dynamics of America, distinguished the Indiana anti-takeover statute
from the Illinois statute, which it previously struck down in MITE.
The court held that, unlike the Illinois statute, the Indiana statute

did not create an imbalance in favor of incumbent management.2 9
The Supreme Court's message from CTS Corp. is clear: States have
the authority to regulate the internal affairs of any corporation that
30
they charter, even if this regulation makes takeovers more difficult.
Pursuant to the authority announced in CTS Corp., the Wisconsin Legislature passed a potent anti-takeover statute.3 1 In 1989, the

United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit unanimously
upheld the constitutionality of the Wisconsin statute. 3a The court
stated that the statute neither violated the Commerce Clause nor

was preempted by the Williams Act of 1968.

3

3

The court, in reach-

ing its conclusion, decided that investors have no right to receive
tender offers, and corporate raiders have no right to realize a profit
1862 (1989). Congress passed the Williams Act in 1968 in response to the increasing number
of hostile tender offers. The Act imposes two requirements. First, the offeror is required to file
a statement disclosing certain information. The offeror must include the following in the statement: the offeror's background and identity; the source and amount of the funds to be used in
making the purchase; the purpose of the purchase, including any plans to liquidate the company or make major changes in its corporate structure and; the extent of the offeror's holdings
in the target company. Second, the Act establishes procedural rules for governing tender offers. For example, the Act requires that the offer remain open for at least 20 business days. 17
CFR § 240.14e-l(a) (1986).
26. See Millon, supra note 12.
27. For a complete discussion of this "corporatization" strategy, see Johnson and Millon,
supra note 25. See also Mary Hoge Ackerly and Wade Matthew Fricke, Note, "May We
Have the Last Dance?" States Take Aim at Corporate Raiders and Crash the Predator's
Ball, 45 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1059 (1988) (discussing states' response to hostile takeovers by
enacting legislation under the guise of traditional regulation of corporate internal affairs).
28. CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69 (1987).
29. Id. at 81-82. The Court stated:
As is apparent from our summary of its reasoning, the overriding concern of the
MITE plurality was that the Illinois statute considered in that case operated to
favor management against offerors, to the detriment of shareholders. By contrast, the statute now before the court protects the independent shareholder
against both of the contending parties.
Id.
30. Id. at 91.
31. WIs. STAT. ANN. § 180.726 (West 1990).
32. Amanda Acquisition Corp. v. Universal Foods Corp., 877 F.2d 496 (7th Cir. 1989),
cert. denied, 493 U.S. 955 (1989).
33. Pub. L. 90-439, July 29, 1968, 82 Stat. 454.
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by making tender offers." ' In effect, the court recognized a state's
right to protect noninvestor interests at the expense of investor inter-

ests. This broad ruling provides states with additional leeway in
which to pass legislation banning hostile takeovers of their domestic

corporations.
In light of CTS Corp. and other recent decisions, state legislatures are passing takeover statutes that represent the first step in
restructuring corporate law.3 5 This recent legislation strives to pro-

tect the various interests of noninvestors. Many of these statutes expand the corporate directors' fiduciary duty by authorizing them to
protect noninvestors3 6 Grants of authority to protect noninvestors
are contrary to the internal perspective that historically considers
only the management-shareholder relationship. 7 Indeed, the internal
perspective is being rejected by most states. 38 Rejection of this perspective represents a sharp departure from nearly a century of corporate law.39 Making corporate law responsive to nonshareholder interests also departs from the principle that shareholder welfare is the
fundamental concern of corporate law. ° States, are responding to
nonshareholder interests by "acknowledging the broad social significance of corporate governance and corporate purpose, as well as the
consequences of corporate activity, and, in the takeover area at least,

are seeking to adjust [corporate] law accordingly.""1
34. Amanda, 877 F.2d 496. Under this Wisconsin statute, a bidder who acquires more
than 10% of a Wisconsin corporation without the target board's consent must wait three years
before merging with it. Id. It is important to note that in most modern offers financing is
contingent upon a prompt merger with the target after its share, are acquired because the
target's assets are used to pay down the debt of acquisition. See generally Roger Parloff, Ruling May Change Shape of Takeovers, MANHATTAN LAW., June 6, 1989, at I.
35. See generally Millon, supra note 12. "As states wrestle with the takeover phenomenon, they may be in the process of revising basic ideas about the relationship between corporations and society and what role corporation law should play in structuring that relationship."
Millon, supra note 12, at 905. For a discussion of corporate social responsibility, see Christopher D. Stone, Corporate Social Responsibility: What it Might Mean, If It Were Really to
Matter, 71 IOwA L. REV. 557 (1986). See also Richard M. Buxba'im, Corporate Legitimacy,
Economic Theory, and Legal Doctrine, 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 515 (1984).
36. See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32, para. 8.85 (Smith-Hurd 1990); IND. CODE ANN. §
23-1-35-1-(d) (Burns 1989); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13-A, § 716 (1989); OHIo REV. CODE
ANN. § 1701.59(D) (Baldwin 1989); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 180.305 (West 1990).
37.

Millon, supra note 12, at 914.

38.

See supra note 36.

39.

See generally Millon, supra note 12.

40.

Millon, supra note 12, at 918.

41.

Milloh, supra note 12, at 926.
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III.
A.

Act 36: A Revolution in Pennsylvania Corporate Law
Analysis of Act 36

By enacting the new anti-takeover statute, Pennsylvania is recognizing the broad social significance of corporate activity. Pennsylvania's Act 36 makes revolutionary changes in corporate governance.

It renders Pennsylvania corporations virtually takeover-proof. This
legislation will have widespread effects since it must be considered
every time a new corporation is formed under Pennsylvania law.
1. Disgorgement Provisions.-One of the most notable features of the new law is Subchapter H. 42 The provisions under this
subchapter pertain to the disgorgement of profits following an acquisition attempt of a public Pennsylvania corporation. 43 The law provides that any profit realized by a controlling person 44 from the sale
of shares, made within 18 months after the person became a controlling person, shall become the property of the corporation. 45 The prof-

its are recoverable if the controlling person acquired the shares
within 24 months before, or 18 months after, becoming a controlling
person. 4" Moreover, would-be acquirors, who already own 20% of
the target, and whose bid is topped by a competing acquiror, could
lose the profit on their shares. 47 The corporation can recover these
profits within two years after they are realized. 4"
2. Control-Share Acquisition Provisions.-The provisions of
Subchapter H tie into the new provisions of Subchapter G that per42. 1990 Pa. Legis. Serv. 36 §§ 2571-2575 (Purdon).
43. Id.
44. Pennsylvania's new anti-takeover statute defines a controlling person or group as:
A person . . . who has acquired, offered to acquire or, directly or indirectly,
publicly disclosed or caused to be disclosed (other than for the purpose of circumventing the intent of this subchapter) the intention of acquiring voting power
over voting shares of a registered corporation that would entitle the holder
thereof to cast at least 20% of the votes that all shareholders would be entitled
to cast in an election of directors of the corporation; or
A person who has otherwise, directly or indirectly, publicly disclosed or caused
to be disclosed (other than for the purpose of circumventing the intent of this
subchapter) that it may seek to acquire control of a corporation through any
m eans .. .
1990 Pa. Legis. Serv, 36 § 2573 (Purdon).
45. 1990 Pa. Legis. Serv. 36 § 2574 (Purdon), comment 32.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. 1990 Pa. Legis. Serv. 36 § 2575. Profits are recoverable in a suit brought by the
corporation or by a shareholder in the name of the corporation if the corporation fails to bring
suit within 60 days after the shareholder so requests. Id.
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tain to control-share acquisitions."9 After a control-share acquisition,
voting shares lose all voting rights if the shares are: acquired as part
of the control-share acquisition; beneficially owned by the person
making the control-share acquisition and acquired within 180 days
of the control-share acquisition; or beneficially owned by the person
making the control-share acquisition and acquired with the intention
of making a control-share acquisition." Lost voting rights may be
restored by a resolution that is approved by a vote of all disinterested
shares5 1 and by a separate vote of all voting shares. 52
3. Labor Provisions.-Pennsylvania's 1990 Anti-Takeover
Law also provides severance compensation for employees terminated
following certain control-share acquisitions."3 An eligible employee
whose position is terminated within ninety days before, or twentyfour months after, the occurrence of a control-share acquisition is
entitled to a minimum severance payment.5" The payment is equal to
the number of years worked (up to twenty-six years) multiplied by
the employee's weekly compensation.55
Labor is further protected under Pennsylvania's new law by
Subchapter J. Under this subchapter, which is subject to certain
49. Control-share acquisitions are defined as:
An acquisition, directly or indirectly, by any person of voting power over voting
shares of a corporation that, but for this subchapter, would, when added to all
voting power of the person over other voting shares of the co:'poration (exclusive
of voting power of the person with respect to existing shares of the corporation),
entitle the person to cast or direct the casting of such a percentage of the votes
for the first time with respect to any of the following ranges that all shareholders
would be entitled to cast in an election of directors of the corporation: (I) at
least 20% but less than 33 /3%; (2) at least 33 1/3% but less than 50%; or (3)
50% or more.
1990 Pa. Legis. Serv. 36 § 2562 (Purdon), comment 37.
50. 1990 Pa. Legis. Serv. 36 § 2563(a) (Purdon).
51. Disinterested shares are defined as those which are not affiliate shares and which are
beneficially owned by the same holder continuously from 12 months preceding the record date,
or are owned five business days prior to the date on which it is first publicly disclosed that the
acquiring person intends to engage in the control-share acquisition as determined by the board
on October 17, 1989 in the case of a corporation which was a registered corporation on that
date or, in any other case, the date Subchapter G becomes applicable to the corporation,
whichever is later, through the record date. 1990 Pa. Legis. Serv. 36 § 2562 (Purdon).
52. 1990 Pa. Legis. Serv. 36 § 2563 (Purdon). Subchapter G '.s subject to certain exceptions and qualifications, including mergers and consolidations that are approved by the board
of directors. A Pennsylvania public corporation that was in existence on April 27, 1990, had a
choice of opting out of the control-share provisions by adopting an amendment to its by-laws
before July 26, 1990. Any Pennsylvania corporation that comes into existence after April 27,
1990, may opt out of these provisions by amending its articles of incorporation within 90 days
after it becomes public.
53. 1990 Pa. Legis. Serv. 36 § 2582 (Purdon).
54. Id.
55. Id.
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qualifications and exceptions, no merger, consolidation, sale, lease,

exchange or other disposition of a business by a public Pennsylvania
corporation may terminate or impair a covered labor contract56 un57
less the parties otherwise agree.
4.

Fiduciary Duty Provisions.-Perhapsthe most notable fea-

tures of Pennsylvania's 1990 Ariti-Takeover Law, and the focus of
this Comment, are the provisions that effectively eliminate a corporate director's fiduciary duty to the shareholders. When determining
the best interests of the corporation, the board of directors is now
authorized to consider, to the extent it deems appropriate, the effects
of any action taken on any or all groups affected by such action.5
Affected groups that directors may consider include: shareholders,
employees, suppliers, customers, creditors, and the communities in
which the office or other corporate establishments are located.5 9
When considering the best interests of the corporation or the
effects of a takeover, the board of directors need not regard any particular group as a dominant or controlling factor.6 0 Therefore, under
this new legislation, the board may consider the shareholders' interests as being on an equal level with noninvestor interests. In addition
to publicly traded corporations, the new fiduciary provisions apply to
the following types of corporations: privately held business corporations, insurance companies, banks, savings and loan associations, and
. The House of Representatives subsequently amended
credit unions.61
the legislation to make these new fiduciary provisions optional.6"
56. A covered labor contract is defined as any labor contract if it:
(1) covers persons in employment in this Commonwealth;
(2) was negotiated by a labor organization or by a collective bargaining agent or
other representative;
(3) relates to a business operation that was owned by the registered corporation
(or any subsidiary thereof) at the time of the control-share approval with respect
to such corporation; and
(4) was in effect and covered such business operation and such employees at the
time of such control share approval.
1990 Pa. Legis. Serv. 36 § 2586 (Purdon).
57. 1990 Pa. Legis. Serv. 36 § 2587 (Purdon).
58. 1990 Pa. Legis. Serv. 36 § 1721(e)(1) (Purdon).
59. Id.
60. 1990 Pa. Legis. Serv. 36 § 1721(e) (Purdon).
61. 1990 Pa. Legis. Serv. 36 § 1721 (Purdon).
62. 1990 Pa. Legis. Serv. 36 § 1721(j)(1)(i) (Purdon). A corporation electing not to be
covered by the new provisions will be covered under existing law. Any time that a new corporation is formed under the laws of Pennsylvania, it will be necessary to choose which standard
of care will be applied to its directors - the standard in effect prior to the enactment of Act
36 or the new standard under Act 36. Publicly traded corporations had until July 26, 1990, to
opt out of the provisions. In order to opt out, directors of these corporations had to adopt a new
bylaw. Other business corporations have until April 27, 1991, to make a decision about opting
out. Insurance companies, nonprofit corporations, banks, savings and loan associations, and
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Pennsylvania's Act 36 is more than just another anti-takeover
law. Some commentators contend that the law "represents a revolution in the corporate governance of all Pennsylvania corporations,
large and small, public and private."6 These changes are significant
for several reasons.64 First, Act 36 demonstrates the extent to which
state legislatures can act when one of their local companies is
threatened by a takeover. Second, the new provisions affect a large
number of companies. Only three other states in the nation have
more public companies incorporated within their borders than does
Pennsylvania. 5 Third, a corporation can avail itself of these takeover
protections by re-incorporating in Pennsylvania; shareholder approval is the corporation's only obstacle. 6
Pursuant to Act 36, directors of Pennsylvania corporations are
now legislators. In considering the interests of noninvestors, directors
must determine which of the varied interests deserve their attention.
Act 36, however, fails to give directors any guidance in making this
determination. 7 Assessing noninvestor interests that deserve attention is not always easy. Also, reconciling varied interests is a difficult
task. Pennsylvania's legislature gives corporate directors an immense
amount of power, but fails to instruct them on how to use it.
Perhaps the most disturbing aspect of Pennsylvania's new antitakeover legislation is that directors are now virtually unaccountable
for their actions. Act 36 explicitly authorizes directors to disregard
any particular interest group. 68 Therefore, pursuant to Act 36, corporate directors themselves will constantly redefine their fiduciary
duties. One day directors may consider suppliers' interests as controlling and the next day consider the employees' interests as
controlling.
credit unions had until July 26, 1990, to opt out by a bylaw adopted by the directors. After
July 26, 1990, directors may opt out of the provisions by amending their articles. Any corporation that has previously opted out of the new fiduciary duty standard may later reverse that
action by repealing the opt out provision of its bylaws or articles. Id.
63. Testimony by William Clark, Jr., Esquire, Business and Commerce Committee of
the Pennsylvania House of Representatives (Feb. 15, 1990).
64. See Charles Bramham etal., Pennsylvania Acts on Takeover Bids, FIN. TIMEs LTD.,
July 19, 1990, § I, at 31. This article describes why the changes in Pennsylvania corporate law
are significant. The article also points out that "the real lesson for would-be acquirors is the
importance of vigilance not only to state laws, but also to the continuing role the state can
play. None of these changes in the law need thwart a takeover bid; the shifting legislation will
merely require shifts in tactics." Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. See generally Sommer, supra note 15.
68. 1990 Pa. Legis. Serv. 36 § 1721(e) (Purdon).
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Act 36: Changing A Century of Corporate Law

The legislature passed Pennsylvania's Act 36, contending that it
merely clarified the fiduciary obligations of directors.69 The proponents of Act 36 maintained that under prior law, a director had a
fiduciary duty to the corporate entity rather than to the shareholders.70 Pennsylvania courts have continuously held, however, that a
corporate director stands in a trustee relationship to the stockholders
and is bound to advance their interests.7 Act 36 virtually eliminates
what Pennsylvania law traditionally held as the directors' fiduciary
duty.
Sections 511 and 1721 of Act 36 set forth the fiduciary obligations of corporate directors. These sections provide that "the board
of directors . . . may, in considering the best interests of the corporation, consider . . . the effects of any action upon any or all groups
affected . . . including shareholders, employees, suppliers, custom'72
ers, and creditors of the corporation, and upon communities.
Clearly, shareholders' interests are no longer of primary concern in
determining the best interests of the corporation. Shareholders are
now demoted to being one of the many groups whose interests may
be considered.
In contrast to Act 36, Pennsylvania corporate law historically
73
held that corporate directors owe a fiduciary duty to shareholders.
In 1872, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court determined the level of
care that corporate directors had to meet in discharging their fiduciary duties. Justice Sharswood wrote in Spering's Appeal74 that directors hold a place of trust which they must use for the benefit of
the stockholders.75 Bird Coal and Iron Co. v. Humes,76 Schaffhauser
69. The introduction to Act 36 states that it is an "act amending Title 15 (Corporations
and Unincorporated Associations) . . .clarifying the fiduciary obligations of directors of corporations and other associations ...." 1990 Pa. Legis. Serv. 36 (Purdon).
70. LEGIS. J., 1989 Sess. (Dec. 12, 1989).
71. See, e.g., Glenn v. Kittanning Brewing Co., 103 A. 340 (Pa. 1918); Schaffhauser v.
Arnholt and Schaefer Brewing Co., 67 A. 417 (Pa. 1907); Bird Coal and Iron v. Humes, 27 A.
750 (Pa. 1893).
72. 1990 Pa. Legis. Serv. 36 §§ 511 (d)(1), 1721(e) (Purdon).
73. Historically, common law in Pennsylvania governed the fiduciary duties of corporate
directors. It was not until 1933 that statutes began to govern these duties. In that year, the
legislature enacted the Business Corporation Law of 1933. [Act of May 5, 1933 (P.L. 364, No.
106)1.
74. 71 Pa. 11 (1872).
75. Id. at 23.
76. 27 A. 750 (Pa. 1893). The court held that "a director is a trustee for the entire body
of stockholders, and both good morals and good law imperatively demand he shall manage all
the business affairs of the company with a view to promote, not his own interests, but the
common interests . . . ."Id. at 752.
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v. Arnholt and Schaefer Brewing Co." and Rathfon v. Lancaster
Trust Co.78 all followed the lead of Spering's Appeal. Each of these
cases, along with others in the early 20th century, 79 established the
well-defined duty of Pennsylvania corporate directors: Directors owe
a fiduciary duty to the shareholders. "No rule is better established
than that the directors of a corporation stand in the position of trust"..
80
ees for the entire body of stockholders .
From 1933 until 1986, the Business Corporation Law of 193381
governed corporate directors' fiduciary duties. Section 408 of this
law provided that corporate directors have a fiduciary relationship to
the corporation.82 During these fifty-three years, Pennsylvania courts
continued to hold that directors owed a fiduciary duty to the share-

holders.83 In 1939, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court made the following observation regarding fiduciary duties: "As a director, [the
defendant] was under a duty and responsibility to discharge the
functions of his office with fidelity to the best interests of the corporation and its shareholders, for whom he was a trustee."8 4 Lower
courts, 5 along with federal courts,8" interpreted directors' fiduciary

duties in the same manner.
Act 36 destroys corporate directors' traditional fiduciary duties.87 It replaces the duty with unfettered discretion that effectively
removes the directors' accountability to those who own the corporation. 8 This is a revolution in corporate law that threatens the very
77. 67 A. 417 (Pa. 1907). In this case, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court found that a
corporate director "shall manage the business of the company in such a manner as to promote,
not his own interests, but the common interests of all the shareholders." Id. at 418.
78. 26 Lancaster L. Rev. 369 (C.P. Lancaster Cty. 1907).
79. See also Hechelman v. Geyer, 252 Pa. 123, 127 (1916); Larkin v. The Auditorium
Co., 17 Berks Cty. Law J. 274, 280 (C.P. Berks Cty. 1925) (citing additional cases).
80. Glenn v. Kittanning Brewing Co., 103 A. 340 (Pa. 1918).
81. Act of May 5, 1933 (P.L. 364, No. 106).
82. Act of May 5, 1933 (P.L. 364, No. 106), 408 (former 15 P.S. § 1408).
83. See, e.g., Bailey v. Jacobs, 189 A. 320 (Pa. 1937).
84. Markovitz v. Markovitz, 8 A.2d 46, 48 (Pa. 1939). More recent cases also hold that
directors of Pennsylvania corporations owe their fiduciary duty to the shareholders. See, e.g.,
Selheimer v. Manganese Corp. of Am., 206 A.2d 28 (Pa. 1966); Rivoli Theater Co. v. Allison,
152 A.2d 449 (Pa. 1959); Maguire v. Osborne, 130 A.2d 157 (1957); Howell v. McCloskey,
99 A.2d 610 (Pa. 1953); Lutherland v. Dahlen, 53 A.2d 143 (Pa. 1947).
85. See, e.g., Ltitheri v. Somerset Door and Column Co., 15 Somerset Legal J. 17 (C.P.
Somerset Cty. 1949); Moser v. Mallick, 20 Northumberland Legal J. 254 (C.P. Northumberland 1948); Prospect Hill Cemetery Co. v. Nielsen, 56 Dauphin Cty. Reports 281 (C.P. Dauphin Cty. 1945); Hunsicker v. Reading Laundries, Inc., 27 Berks Cty. L.J. 211 (C.P. Berks
Cty. 1935).
86. See, e.g., Higgins v. Shenango Pottery Co., 256 F.2d 504 (3d Cir. 1958); Zweifach
v. Scranton Lace Co., 156 F. Supp. 384 (M.D. Pa. 1957).
87. See 1990 Pa. Legis. Serv. 36 §§ 511(d)(1), 1721(e)('.) (Purdon).
88. See generally LEGIS. J., 1989 Sess. (Dec. 12, 1989). Senator Brightbill explained
that shareholders are no longer the director's primary concern. The Senator stated that "the
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concept of capitalism.
From 1983 until 1990, Pennsylvania law provided that "in considering the best interests of the corporation, [the directors may]
consider the effects of any action upon employees, suppliers, and customers of the corporation and upon communities in which offices or
other establishments of the corporation are located." 89 Clearly, by
the phrasing of this provision, shareholder interests are equated with
those of noninvestors. "The best interests of the corporation," which
is interpreted to mean the stockholders' interests,9" is distinguished
from noninvestor interests. Act 36 relegates stockholders to being
just one of the many groups that directors can consider. Under current Pennsylvania law, corporate directors need only consider shareholder interests "to the extent they deem appropriate."' Furthermore, directors need not consider shareholder interests as "a
dominant or controlling factor." 92
C. Act 36: Repudiating Two Leading Corporate Law Cases
The Anti-Takeover Law of 1990 turns Pennsylvania's corporate
law in an opposite direction from two leading Delaware cases.93 In
Unocal Corporation v. Mesa Petroleum,9" Mesa, a minority shareholder of approximately 13 % of Unocal stock, made a hostile tender
offer. 95 The tender offer was for 64 million shares, or approximately
37% of the corporation's outstanding stock. 98 Mesa offered $54.00
per share.9 Mesa brought an action to challenge the decision of
Unocal's directors to effect a self-tender offer for its own shares,
thereby excluding Mesa's participation.98 The Court of Chancery
granted the preliminary injunction which Mesa requested, and Unocal appealed.9 9
shareholder has been demoted. [The shareholder] is being kicked out of [the] corporation.
[The shareholder] is being asked to put up the money to make the capital investment and now
• . . is being relegated to just one of the many groups that the board of directors should
consider." Id. at 1503.
89. 15 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 511(b), 1721(c) (repealed 1990).
90. See, e.g., Corporate Director's Guidebook, 33 Bus. LAW. 159, 1599-1601 (1978)
(directors are responsible to the shareholders whose interests are one and the same as the
interests of the corporate entity).
91. 1990 Pa. Legis. Serv. 36 §§ 511(d), 1721(e) (Purdon).
92. 1990 Pa. Legis. Serv. 36 § 511(d) (Purdon).
93. Revlon v. MacAndrews and Forbes Holdings, 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986); Unocal
Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum, 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
94. 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
95. Id. at 949.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 949-52.
99. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum, 493 A.2d 946, 952 (Del. 1985).
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The issue presented to the Delaware Supreme Court was

whether or not the Unocal board had the power and the duty to
oppose a takeover threat if it reasonably perceived the takeover to be
harmful to the corporate enterprise.' 00 If the board did have this

power, the court then had to determine if the board's action warranted the protection of the business judgment rule.'0 1
The court found that there is a danger that directors may act
primarily for their own interests, rather than for shareholder interests.'0 2 Therefore, an enhanced duty exists that calls for a threshold

judicial examination before the protections of the business judgment
rule may be conferred. 0 * The Delaware Supreme Court held that
the repurchase plan adopted by the board of directors was reasonable in view of the threat that the board rationally believed Mesa
posed.' 0 4 This holding sets the precedent that directors' actions
which influence an acquisition are not to be judged by the business

judgment rule. Rather, these actions are to be judged by a higher
standard of care - a standard which provides that these actions
must be reasonable in relation to the threat posed.

The Pennsylvania Takeover Act of 1990 expressly repudiates
this higher standard of care. The legislation provides that absent a
breach of fiduciary duty, self-dealing or lack of good faith, any act
undertaken by the board of directors is presumed to be in the best
interests of the corporation. 0 5 The law also gives clear guidance to
courts in determining whether a board of directors has met its fiduciary duty of care. It provides that there is no greater obligation to
100. Id. at 953.
101. Id. The business judgment rule is a "presumption that in making a business decision the directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, irgood faith and in honest
belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the company." Aronson v. Lewis, 473
A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984). When utilizing the business judgment rule, a court will not replace
the judgment of the board of directors with its own if the latter's decision can be "attributed to
any rational business purpose." Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971).
The business judgment rule greatly reduces judicial review. See, e.g., Trecon, Inc. v. Land of
Lincoln Sav. & Loan, 749 F.2d 374 (7th Cir. 1984); Buffalo Forge Co. v. Ogden Corp., 717
F.2d 757 (2nd Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1018 (1983); Panter v. Marshall Field & Co.,
646 F.2d 271 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981). For a discussion of the
business judgment rule and the problems surrounding it see Lyman Johnson, Corporate Takeovers and Corporations: Who Are They For?, 43 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 781, 798-802 (1986).
See also S. Samuel Arsht, The Business Judgment Rule Revisited, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 93
(1979).
102. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 954.
103. Id. The Delaware Supreme Court found that due to the "omnipresent specter that
a board may be acting primarily in its own interests, rather than those of the corporation and
its shareholders, there is an enhanced duty which calls for judicial examination at the threshold before the protections of the business judgment rule may be conferred." Id.
104. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum, 493 A.2d 946, 958 (Del. 1985).
105. 1990 Pa. Legis. Serv. 36 § 1721(d) (Purdon).
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justify an act by the board relating to or affecting an acquisition,
than is required for any other act undertaken by the board. 0 6 In
both instances, clear and convincing evidence must be provided in
order to establish that a decision regarding an acquisition was not
made in good faith. °7
The second leading Delaware corporate law case that the new
anti-takeover law repudiates is Revlon v. MacAndrews and Forbes
Holdings.'0 a This case intimates that a corporate director's only duty
is to maximize shareholder profits. In Revlon, Pantry Pride, Inc.
brought an action seeking to enjoin certain defensive transactions
used by Revlon directors to thwart Pantry Pride's attempts to acquire Revlon.'
In June 1985, Pantry Pride offered to buy Revlon
for $45.00 per share." 0 Responding to this offer, the board of directors adopted a "poison pill plan," consisting primarily of high-priced
notes, which Revlon offered to its shareholders."' Subsequently,
Pantry Pride made a new offer of $47.50 per share." 2 At this point,
the board began to negotiate a leveraged buyout with Forstmann
Little, finally agreeing to an offer between $50.00 and $53.00 a
share. a As the bidding continued, the value of the shareholder
notes decreased and the board of directors began to fear possible
litigation." 4 In return for a promise that the note holders would be
protected, Revlon agreed to stop accepting new bids." 5 It also gave
Forstmann Little an option to buy certain company assets at a price
below market value." 6 Pantry Pride then offered $58.00 per share."'
106. Id. § 1721(g).
107. Id.
108. 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
109. Id. at 173.
110. Id. at 176.
111. A "poison pill" plan is a defensive tactic used by corporations in order to fend off
attempted hostile takeovers. Assuming the board of directors received shareholder approval of
the creation of a class of preferred stock to be issued (upon such terms and with such preferences as may be set by the board), the board may distribute to its common shareholders a
dividend in the form of a convertible preferred stock. Under a "poison pill" plan, the preferred
stock contains a "flipover" provision permitting (in the event of a tender offer followed by a
freeze-out merger) the preferred stock to be convertible into the common stock of the bidder.
This presents the would-be bidder with the prospect of earnings dilution if the tender offer is
successful. See id. at 180.
112. Id. at 177.
113. Leverage buy-out occurs when a bidder uses junk bonds to buy a corporation. At
this point, the corporation has substantial debt, unable to invest in new technology or equipment, for example. For a discussion of leveraged buy-outs in the context of Act 36, see LEGIS.
J., 1989 Sess. (Dec. 12, 1989).
114. Revlon v. MacAndrews and Forbes Holdings, 506 A.2d 173, 178 (Del. 1986).
115. Id. at 178-79.
116. Id. at 178.
117. Id. at 176-79.
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Offers per share kept increasing, making the sale of Revlon imminent.11 At this point, the court said that the directors' role
changed from "defenders of the corporate bastion to auctioneers
charged with getting the best price for the stockholders.""' 9 The
court explained that concern for noninvestor interests, such as the
noteholders, is inappropriate when there is an auction among active
bidders. 2 ' At this time, the directors' duty is to sell the corporation
to the highest bidder. 2 ' The Delaware Supreme Court condemned
the board's action, stating that where a significant by-product of the
directors' action is to protect themselves against a threat of personal
liability, the action cannot withstand the enhanced Unocal scrutiny. 22 Many courts follow the Revlon standard, holding 2 3that the
sole duty of a director is to maximize shareholder profits.
Because of Act 36, Pennsylvania corporate directors no longer
have a duty to maximize profits of shareholders. Directors are not
required to act solely because of an effect their action might have on
an acquisition of the corporation."2 Moreover, the legislation provides that the directors need not take action based on the amount of
money that might be offered or paid to shareholders in the event of
an acquisition.' 2" Thus, Pennsylvania corporate directors are no
longer liable for failing to provide profits for shareholders.
Finally, Pennsylvania's Anti-Takeover Law of 1990 clearly
states that the fiduciary duties of corporate directors do not require
them to redeem rights issued under a shareholder rights plan.' 26 Fiduciary obligations do not require directors to modify, or render in27
applicable, any such plan.
118.

Id. at 182.

119.

Revlon v. MacAndrews and Forbes Holdings, 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1986).

Id.
121. The Delaware Supreme Court held that there are limitations on considering
noninvestor interests. "A board may have regard for various constituencies in discharging its
responsibilities, provided there are rationally related benefits accruing to the stockholders." Id.
122. Id. at 184.
123. See, e.g., Edelman v. Fruehauf, 798 F.2d 882 (6th Cir. 1986); Black and Decker v.
American Standard, 682 F. Supp. 772 (D. Del. 1988).
124. 1990 Pa. Legis. Serv. 36 § 1721(0(3) (Purdon).
120.

125.

Id.
126. 1990 Pa. Legis. Serv. 36 § 1721(f)(1) (Purdon). A shareholder rights plan is also
called a "poison pill." For a definition of a "poison pill" see supra note I Il and accompanying
text.
127.

Id.
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IV. Consequences of Act 36
A.

Protection of Noninvestors

Anti-takeover statutes, such as Pennsylvania's Act 36, provide
advantages for noninvestor interests. Legislatures design these statutes to prevent corporations from achieving arbitrary power over employees, consumers, suppliers, communities, and others who deal

with corporations. 2 ' Act 36 mandates that directors of Pennsylvania
corporations take into consideration the effects of any action upon
noninvestor interests.' 21 9

Many commentators 3 ° argue that hostile takeovers provide
gains for shareholders by destroying the established relationships between certain noninvestors and the corporation.'
They point out
that even successful efforts to ward off hostile takeover attempts are
often harmful to noninvestors. For example, radical corporate restructuring often causes significant job losses.' 32 Anti-takeover legislation responds to these concerns, defining as its intended beneficiaries noninvestors who are vulnerable in their dealings with the
corporations. '33 North Carolina's Business Combination Statute, for
instance, contains a preamble which announces that the statute is
designed to protect against corporate takeovers.' 34 The statute's preamble describes takeovers as "causing among other things, high un35
employment and erosion of state and local economy and tax base.'
Commentators also contend that corporate acquisitions usually
do not lead to more productive, efficient business enterprises. Profes128. See generally Millon, supra note 12.
129. 1990 Pa. Legis. Serv. 36 § 511(d)(1) (Purdon).
130. Many commentators argue that shareholders of target companies benefit from hostile takeovers. Shareholders often receive a substantial premium for their shares over the existing market price. For a detailed discussion of shareholder benefits and hostile takeovers see
Peter Dodd & Richard S. Ruback, Tender Offers and Shareholder Returns: An Empirical
Analysis, 5 J. FIN. ECON. 351, 372 (1977) (arguing that shareholders of target companies earn
large and significant abnormal returns in the month following the announcement of a tender
offer). See also Michael Bradley, Interfirm Tender Offers and the Market for Corporate Control, 53 J. Bus. L. 345 (1980) (demonstrating that shareholders of a target company gain from
takeovers even when they do not tender their shares); Gregg A. Jarrell & Michael Bradley,
The Economic Effects of Federal and State Regulation of Cash Tender Offers, 23 J. L. &
ECON. 371 (1980); Michael C. Jensen & Richard S. Ruback, The Market for Corporate Control: The Scientific Evidence, II J. FIN. ECON. 5 (1983).
131. See, e.g., SCHLIEFER & SUMMERS. BREACH OF TRUST IN HOSTILE TAKEOVERS (National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. 2342, 1987).
132. See, e.g., Martin Lipton, Corporate Governance in the Age of Finance Corporatism, 136 U. PA. L. REV. I, 26 (1987).
133. See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13-A § 716 (1989); 1987 N.C. Sess. Laws 124;
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.59(D) (Baldwin 1989).
134. 1987 N.C. Sess. Laws 124.
135. Id.
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sor F.M. Scherer and Mr. David Rabenscraft collected substantial
evidence on corporate mergers during the 1960's and early 1970's.136
They found that, on the average, these corporations were highly
profitable before being acquired. 7 After the acquisition, however,
the same corporations often experienced a decline in profitability.1 3 8
Professors Herman and Lowenstein conducted a second study of corporate acquisitions. They examined fifty-six hostile tender offers initiated between 1975 and 1983.' They found a significant decline in
the acquired corporations post-merger financial performance. 40 Herman and Lowenstein concluded that hostile takeovers do not necessarily lead to efficiency gains.'
Pennsylvania's Anti-Takeover Law renders the state's corporations virtually takeover-proof. Consequently, Pennsylvania gives
noninvestors greater protection than other states, with the possible
exception of Indiana. The Indiana anti-takeover statute,' 2 which the
Supreme Court upheld in CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp., 4 ' is the
only statute in the nation that is comparable to Pennsylvania's new
law. In fact, the Pennsylvania legislature modelled Act 36 after the
Indiana statute. 4 4 Both statutes contain a provision that gives significant protection from hostile takeovers. This provision, which is
worded almost identically in both statutes, deals with the corporate
directors' duty concerning a shareholder rights plan (the "poison
pill"). Indiana's statute explicitly states that "directors are not required . . . to redeem any rights under or to render inapplicable a
shareholder rights [or poison pill] plan . . . solely because of the
effect such action might have on a proposed acquisition of control of
136. At the time this data was collected, Professor Scherer vas a Professor of Economics at Swarthmore College and Mr. Ravenscraft was with the Bureau of Economics, Federal
Trade Commission.
137. See David Ravenscraft and F.M. Scherer, The Profitability of Mergers (Dec.
1985) (working paper, copy on file at William Mitchell Law Review office).
138. Id. See also Martin Lipton, Takeover Bids in the Target's Boardroom, 35 Bus.
LAW, 101 (1979) (arguing that directors must consider the interests of noninvestors). Lipton
argues that, "In this era of takeovers the directors of a company may find that it is good
business management to take steps to assure employees, suppliers, customers and communities
in which the company operates that the company intends to continue its current business policies and to that end intends to remain an independent entity and not be taken over." Id. at
110.
139. See Herman and Lowenstein, The Efficiency Effects of Hostile Takeovers: an Empirical Study (a study in proceedings of Columbia University's Center for Law and Economic
Studies' Conference on Takeovers and Contests for Corporate Control) (Nov. 1985).
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-35-1(d) (Burns 1989).
143. 481 U.S. 69 (1987).
144. For a complete discussion of the Senate debates over Act 36, see LEGIS. J., 1989
Sess. (Dec. 12, 1989). See also LEGIS. J., 1989 Sess. (Dec. 13, 1989).
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the corporation .... .
Moreover, like Act 36, Indiana's statute authorizes directors of
Indiana corporations to unilaterally reject an unsolicited bid for their
company. " 6 Indiana directors need not take action solely because of
"the amounts that might be paid to shareholders under an acquisition."' 47 Like corporate directors in Pennsylvania, directors in Indiana will not be held liable for failing to provide an equal or better
alternative for the shareholders, 48
The Indiana and Pennsylvania anti-takeover statutes give
noninvestor interests the most protection, while giving shareholders
the least protection. During the Senate debates regarding Act 36,
Senator Noah Wenger explained the new protection given to
noninvestors. He stated that Act 36 sends "a signal that raiders that
try to take over Pennsylvania corporations will have to play by a set
of rules that are going to be fair to all parties involved."' 49
B.

Uncontrollable Power for Corporate Directors

One prominent disadvantage of Pennsylvania's new anti-takeover legislation is that noninvestor constituencies are not always easily identifiable. Requiring the board of directors to consider
noninvestor interests introduces the possibility of an almost unlimited
number of new competitors for a corporation's residual assets. Furthermore, it is never easy to determine how much attention a particular constituency deserves. Giving the board of directors the power
to resolve these issues requires giving the board an immense responsibility. "Entrusting [the board of directors] with such responsibility
is not without potentially serious problems and clearly the outcome
of doing so in a particular case is uncertain simply because assessing
and reconciling various claims on a corporation is a difficult task
... " This raises the question of whether or not corporate directors are trained, or equipped, to serve as guardians for all noninvestor interests.
Pennsylvania's new legislation gives the board of directors the
ability to act both in a socially responsible manner and to act in
145. IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-35-1(f) (Burns 1989).
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. LEGIS. J., 1989 Sess. at 1502 (Dec. 12, 1989).
150. Lyman Johnson, Minnesota's Control Share Acquisition Statute and the Need for
New Judicial Analysis of State Takeover Legislation, 12 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 183, 221
(1986).
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favor of itself - all at the expense of the shareholders.1 51 Giving
Pennsylvania corporate directors the authority to reject unsolicited
bids for control of'their corporations equates to giving the board job
security. State anti-takeover policies can be viewed as mechanisms to
entrench incumbent, and often times incompetent, management. 152
Not only does Act 36 invite economic inefficiencies by entrenching management, but it also has the potential of driving investors away from Pennsylvania corporations. With six days remaining
for corporations to opt out of several Act 36 provisions, prices of
Pennsylvania corporate stock suffered.' On July 20, 1990, the New
York Times reported evidence of investors switching to companies
that opted out of Act 36 takeover protections. 54 Two finance professors at.the University of Washington Business School in Seattle conducted a recent study of Pennsylvania corporate stock.' 5 5 The study
indicated that the stocks of Pennsylvania-based companies underperformed the Standard & Poor's 500 stock average by 6.9%
from October 1989, when the anti-takeover legisliation was first announced, to January 1990, when the legislation passed in the Senate. 56 This underperformance may be an early indication that potential investors will be turning away from Pennsylvania
corporations protected under Act 36.
V.

Dealing with Noninvestor Interests

A.

Laissez Faire Policy

Finding that anti-takeover statutes may deter potential investors, several commentators believe that corporate directors have no
duty to protect the interests of noninvestors.1 57 They argue that employees, suppliers, creditors and other noninvestors actually benefit
151. See generally Lyman Johnson, Corporate Takeovers ard Corporations: Who Are
They For?, 43 WASH. & LEF. L. REV. 781 (1986). "[T]he law has accorded management
considerable discretion and flexibility in operating the corporation and in conjunction with
institutional reality, also made it very difficult for investors to challenge the exercise of managerial prerogatives." Id. at 794.
152. See, e.g., Comment, The Constitutionality of Minnesota's New Corporate Takeover Act: The Cardiff Failure, II WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 853, 865 n.77 (1985).
153. See, e.g., Leslie Wayne, Many Companies in Pennsylvania Reject State's Takeover
Protection, N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 1990, at Al. On July 20, 1990, the New York Times reported
the following leading Pennsylvania companies opted out of the protections provided by Act 36:
Allegheny Ludlum, Mellon Bank, The Sun Company, The Rorer Group, Quaker Chemical,
PNC Financial Corporation, Westinghouse. id.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. See Frank H. Easterbrook and Daniel R. Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's
Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REv. 1161 (1981).
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from corporate acquisitions.' 5 8 An acquisition, according to this
view, improves the economic efficiency of the corporation and advances the position of all noninvestors who deal with the corporation.159 The new owners, in order to improve corporate performance,
cannot lay off employees or discard valuable suppliers. 160
This view does have some merit. A corporation's successors have
no incentive to dismantle any existing policy that is in the corporation's best interests. An inevitable and indispensable characteristic of
a capitalistic society is the risk of displacement. 1 6' An attempt by
corporate directors to "minimize this risk by preventing new owners
from having the opportunity to operate more efficiently . . . is anticompetitive."' 62 Protecting noninvestor interests, at the expense of
the shareholders, would be harmful to the corporate enterprise. Dividing the directors' loyalty between shareholders and noninvestors
could reduce a potential stockholder's willingness to invest in a
corporation. 6 '
Although the laissez faire approach holds that corporate directors have no duty to protect noninvestors, it does not forbid directors
from protecting the noninvestors.1 4 Directors can always consider
noninvestor interests provided that this consideration relates to the
best interests of the shareholders.16 5
B.

Permissive Statutes

The laissez faire approach has been uniformly adopted by many
states. Most anti-takeover legislation does permit corporate directors
to consider noninvestor interests. 6 Permissive anti-takeover statutes
158. See generally id.
159. Id.
160. Easterbrook and Fischel state that:
If maintaining good community relations is in the interest of the firm, then the
new owners will maintain the existing policies. And if the target's community
relations were not in the firm's interests, then old management was diverting
shareholders' wealth to friends or other favorites. If the existence of such diversion were demonstrable, it would amount to a breach of the manager's fiduciary
duty to shareholders whether or not a takeover occurred.
Id. at 1190 n.82.
161. Id. at 1190 n.83.
162. Easterbrook and Fischel, supra note 157, at 1190 n.83.
163. See Easterbrook and Fischel, supra note 157, at 1191.
164. See generally Sommer, supra note 15.
165. See generally Easterbrook and Fischel, supra note 157.
166. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32, para. 8.85 (Smith-Hurd 1990); IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-35I(d) (Burns 1989); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13-A § 716 (1989); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
1701.59(D) (Baldwin 1989); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 180.305 (West 1990).
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permit directors to consider noninvestor interests,"6 7 however, directors may only consider noninvestor interests in addition to shareholder interest. The majority of states have permissive anti-takeover
statutes. 6 ' For example, Minnesota's statute expresses in detail
those noninvestor interests that directors are permitted to con172 Kentucky, 173 and Ohio 74
sider. ' " Maine,170 Illinois,' 71 Wisconsin,
also have permissive anti-takeover legislation that permits directors

to consider the interests of noninvestors. Each of these states expressly permit the directors of their domestic corporations to consider the interests of employees, suppliers, customers and the communities in which the corporation is located. 175 These state
legislatures declare that they have a legitimate state interest in pro7
moting stable, long-term growth for their domestic corporations. 1
Legislatures also have an interest in the welfare of employees, sup-

pliers, customers and the communities in which the corporation is
located.
Many states that have permissive anti-takeover statutes do not
expressly eliminate or alter the fiduciary duty of directors to the
shareholders. 77 For example, Kentucky's anti-takeover statute permits directors to consider noninvestor interests, but only in addition
to those of the shareholders.' 78 Therefore, the traditional fiduciary
duty that directors owe to the shareholders remains.
C. Pennsylvania's Statute: Mandatory Consideration of Noninvestor Interests

Pennsylvania's new anti-takeover statute is distinguished from
167.
In discharging the duties of the position of director, a director may, in considering the best interests of the corporation, consider the interests of the corporation's employees, customers, suppliers, and creditors, the eccnomy of the state
and nation, community and societal considerations, and the long-term as well as
short-term interests of the corporation and its shareholders including the possibility that these interests may be best served by the continued independence of
the corporation.
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.251(5) (West Supp. 1991).
168. See infra notes 169-74.
169. MINN STAT. ANN. § 302A. 251(5) (West Supp. 1991).
170. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13-A § 716 (1989).
171. ILL REV. STAT. ch. 32, para. 8.85 (Smith-Hurd 1990).
172. WIs. STAT. ANN. § 180.305 (West 1990).
173. Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 271 B.12-210 (4) (Baldwin 1989).
174. OIo REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.59(D) (Baldwin 1989).
175. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.251(5) (West Supp. 1991).
176. Id.
177. See. e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 271B.12-210(4) (Baldwin 1989).
178. Id.
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the majority of other states' statutes because it is a mandatory statute.' 7 9 Accordingly, under Act 36, corporate directors must consider
the interests of noninvestors. 18 0 Permissive statutes, on the other
hand, allow directors to consider noninvestor interests, but do not
mandate that the directors do so.' 8 ' While mandating that directors
consider noninvestor interests, Act 36 does not require directors to
regard any interest as dominant. 182 Taken together, these provisions
eliminate all enforceable fiduciary duties of corporate directors.
Thus, under any circumstances, corporate directors have unfettered discretion to decide to whom they owe a fiduciary duty. One
day directors may place the interests of employees over shareholder
interests, but the very next day they may disregard employees in
favor of shareholders. One commentator explains that "directors will
not owe a defined fiduciary duty to any group under [Act 36], but
will be free to change at will the beneficiaries of the fiduciary
duty." 3 Since directors are free to consider or ignore any given interest,' Pennsylvania corporate directors do not have any enforceable fiduciary duties.
Act 36 does not provide shareholders a remedy when corporate
directors breach their fiduciary duty. Under prior Pennsylvania law,
shareholders had a remedy - a derivative suit.' 8 5 The new legislation eliminates the directors' duty to shareholders, 186 thus, there can
be no cause of action for its breach. In fact, no group can bring a
cause of action for the breach of directors' fiduciary duties. Act 36
eliminates the directors' fiduciary duty to shareholders without replacing it with an enforceable duty to any other group. Thus, Pennsylvania corporate directors are no longer accountable for their
179. During the Senate debates over Act 36 on December 12, 1989, Senator Brightbill
pointed out the defects of mandatory statutes. He contended that:
Once the courts get a hold of this provision, once they start plugging this fiduciary relationship into suits by suppliers, into suits under collective bargaining
agreements, into suits by communities, once directors start getting sued by suppliers, employees, communities and everyone else, we are going to find out that
we painted tonight with a broad brush. Where will the courts take this concept,
Mr. President? I am going to suggest that no one knows and none of us can
foresee.
LEGIS. J., 1989 Sess. at 1504 (Dec. 12, 1989), comment 139.
180. 1990 Pa. Legis. Serv. 36 § 511(d) (Purdon).
181. See, e.g., ME.REV. STAT ANN. tit. 13-A, § 716 (1989).
182. 1990 Pa. Legis. Serv. 36 § 1721(e) (Purdon). See also 1990 Pa. Legis. Serv. 36 §
511(d) (Purdon).
183. Testimony by William Clark, Jr., Esquire, Business and Commerce Committee of
the Pennsylvania House of Representatives (Feb. 15, 1990).
184. 1990 Pa. Legis. Serv. 36 §§ 511, 1721 (Purdon).
185. See supra text accompanying notes 69-86.
186. See, e.g., LEGIS. J, 1989 Sess. at 1503 (Dec. 12, 1989).
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actions.
Pennsylvania corporate directors will define what they want
their fiduciary duty to mean. In reality, Pennsylvania corporate directors will be a law unto themselves. One commentator, agreeing
with this conclusion, states that Act 36 is "a disingenuous attempt to
allow management to justify any corporate action it may desire to
undertake on the grounds that such action benefits a portion of the
vastly enlarged corporate constituency, even if the best interests of
the corporation's owners are disregarded in the process." 187
VI.

Conclusion

Pennsylvania's new Anti-Takeover Law of 1990 changes a century of corporate law. Under this law, Pennsylvania corporate directors no longer owe an enforceable fiduciary duty to the stockholders.
Instead, the corporate directors are permitted to define their own fiduciary duties.
If the Pennsylvania legislature has concluded that noninvestor
interests deserve protection from hostile corporate takeovers, Act 36
is inadequate. 8 First, Act 36 does not give directors any standards
to follow in evaluating the potential harm, or benefit, of a particular
acquisition. Second, the statute does not give any guidance on how to
balance the beneficial effects of an acquisition on one group against
the detrimental effects on another. This decision will necessarily become politicized, with possible detrimental consequences to the
Pennsylvania economy. Third, and perhaps most disturbing, Act 36
makes directors a law unto themselves, giving them an uncontrollable amount of discretion.
There is the possibility that corporate directors will utilize this
discretion to advance their own interests - to the detriment of all
other interests. Directors, however, will always need to consider the
forces of the market place. The investing community will not support
directors who totally disregard the interests of shareholders. There187. Testimony by William Clark, Jr., Esquire, Business and Commerce Committee of
the Pennsylvania House of Representatives (Feb. 15, 1990). Mr. Clark continued,
I believe that the General Assembly should be offended by the spectacle of fiduciaries who have undertaken to manage other people's property coming to it asking that the rules be changed so the fiduciaries may deal with the property entrusted to them in any manner the deem appropriate and free of the duty they
initially undertook.
Id.
188. Some commentators argue that in the current legal and economic climate an evenhanded federal corporate law is needed. For a discussion of the attr.butes of a federal business
corporations code see Elliott J. Weiss, A Proposal for a Federal Takeover Law, 9 CARDOZO L.
REV. 1699 (1988).
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fore, the market may ultimately correct any mistakes the Pennsylvania Legislature made.
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